Why New Truce Talks Are Unlikely to End Trump's War on Iran

Despite the economic and political pressure he's under, ending the war now would mean an epic defeat for Trump. So, for now the negotiating table remains another theater of battle

Oil markets seem to have recognized that Trump’s two-week truce announced Wednesday is unlikely to mean the end of his war on Iran. Having dropped $15 a barrel on the announcement, the Brent Crude index is creeping steadily back up as it becomes clear that it’s too soon to believe the U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran has ended. Nor is the spoiler factor simply the determination of Israel and the UAE to sabotage any deal: If the war was ended on the basis of the current balance of force, and on the terms outlined in the Iranian 10-point plan Trump says he’s accepted, he’d be unable to hide or spin the reality that the war of choice into which Israel led him has been an epic defeat for the U.S. So, there are many factors that will pressure him to renew the hostilities he has now paused — the U.S. is already declaring that the 10-point plan agreed by Iran isn’t the same one they saw…

The fact that Israel unleashed a massacre from the air on Lebanon after the truce was announced – Pakistan, the supposed mediator (though there are indications that the U.S. instructed the Pakistani leadership to declare a truce), said the truce included the Lebanon front; Israel insisted it did not. Even the European Union leadership insisted it should. But Trump Administration officials deny the agreement extended to the savagery of its Israeli protégé/tutor in Lebanon. So, the immediate state of the Lebanon front will be a key early indicator of the balance of leverage at the negotiating table: If Israel, even quietly, dials back its bombing campaign, that will be a sign that Iran is able to set the terms of negotiation, at least at this point. For all the genocidal huffery of Trump and Hegseth, it’s clear that the two-week ceasefire proclaimed by Trump was initiated by the U.S. side.

Of course, it remains extremely unlikely that the U.S. side would agree to all of Iran’s demands (compensation, recognition of Iran’s right to charge rents on shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, an end to all U.S. sanctions – many of those would require a congressional vote, giving Israel plenty of room to influence a reversal) but clearly he has been forced to make some gestures towards Tehran’s demands.

But the reason the Israelis, the Emiratis and longtime Iran hawks in Washington would oppose a peace agreement right now are plain to see: The war has simply not accomplished any strategic purpose; in fact it’s been more of a strategic reversal for the U.S. There was never any “nuclear threat” from Iran, nor was Iran threatening to launch aggression against any of its neighbors before the U.S.-Israeli bombing began. The only plausible goal of launching the U.S.-Israeli aggression, besides a performative demonstration of U.S. power hoping to intimidate all challengers into quiescence (a Persian Venezuela model) was to topple Iran’s regime and replace it with a U.S.-Israel friendly alternative. Needless to say, it has failed thus far on both counts.

After 40 days of pounding by the world’s most powerful military (helped, if not directed by the region’s most powerful military)

• Iran’s regime has survived – effectively a victory in an asymmetrical conflict where the unconventional military wins by not losing

• It has continued to fire missiles across the region throughout the U.S.-Israel operation

• It’s mastery of the Strait of Hormuz, with the resultant choking effect on global trade, has actually strengthened Iran’s position — Trump found himself centering his war aims on reopening the Strait, which had been open before he started his war, i.e. Trump ended up forced to try and solve a problem his war had created. Even then, he was unable to achieve it by force, and was forced to negotiate a solution with a regime he’d hoped to have eliminated, but had inadvertently strengthened.

In contrast, the war has strategically weakened the U.S.

• It has shown the limits of what its immense military power can achieve;

• It has left the U.S. more globally isolated than ever because of the economic impact of its reckless decision to start a war no one other than Israel saw as necessary, and has left U.S. allies in the region considering the long-term viability of a U.S.-centered security order

• it has wrought profound, global economic damage from which there’ll be no short-term recovery even if the war has, in fact ended, not least in the U.S. itself where Trump will cut social services relied on by much of his MAGA base in order to pay for his war

For Israel, of course, it’s a win – they managed to drag the U.S. into doing something they could never have done alone, and at the same time expanded its dominion into Lebanon, cemented its control of the West Bank while unleashing settler terror to pursue ethnic cleansing, and has continued to throttle Gaza.

But Israeli overreach is looming, with everything from the head of the military complaining that the demands on its troops was raising the danger of collapse, its population having experienced significant damage (hidden from the media) that undermines its leaders’ promise of security through war, and potentially now being blamed by U.S. leaders for having created this disaster.

So, yes, if this is indeed the end, Trump’s “excursion” in Iran will be judged by history alongside the likes of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan as epic imperial failures. And that’s why we should assume it will continue, in one form or another.

Again, as I wrote last week, it’s worth remembering the Vietnam example:

A month into the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, we shouldn’t be distracted by the illusion that Trump’s talk of negotiations promising an imminent end to hostilities. On the contrary, “negotiations” or posturing over the terms of an agreement to end the war are — as the U.S. war on Vietnam showed us — simply another front on which the war is fought. And usually when, as we’ve seen now, the two sides of an expeditionary war set out dramatically different terms as their basis for negotiating a resolution, each side seeks to reinforce the leverage behind its demands by inflicting greater levels of pain on its adversary. The militarily stronger side tries to bludgeon its enemy into collapse or capitulation; while the weaker party seeks to raise the cost to the aggressor of continuing the war. Both sides know that nothing can be won at the negotiating table that hasn’t been won in the field, but both sides also see value in appearing ready for peace.

Like the Strait of Hormuz and the skies above Tehran and Beirut, the negotiating table for now remains another theater of battle.

And to the extent, as is the case thus far, that Iran is able to set terms that codify a U.S. strategic defeat there, the likelihood of continued confrontation on other fronts remains high.